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Presently, Zimbabwe is very much out of the news. The 2013 elections 
have come and gone; the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic 
Front (ZANU-PF) has reasserted its hold on state power; the economy 
is getting worse and worse; and the world continues to await the dis-
placement or death of the country’s nonagenarian president, Robert 
Mugabe. In a word, it’s pretty much business as usual, except in so far as 
the climaxing of competing tragedies in such countries as South Sudan 
and Burundi now render Zimbabwe an African sideshow. True, there is 
considerable interest in the intra–ZANU-PF power struggles around the 
presidential succession, but generally the global perspective on Zim-
babwe is one of resignation. In essence, this contribution argues that 
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external interventions to change Zimbabwe’s course have been miserably 
ineffective. Accordingly, a democratic solution to the country’s travails is 
pretty much a non-starter, and the best that can be hoped for is a not-
too-violent political transition to a post-Mugabe order. If Zimbabweans 
want a democracy, they must be left to create it for themselves. 
The two books reviewed here throw much light on why this policy 
position – which I take to be that of the Western and even some African 
elites – has come about. They are very different books. David Coltart’s 
volume uses autobiography to explore the bitter disappointments of 
Zimbabwean history. In contrast, Michael Bratton’s book explains the 
Zimbabwean impasse by drawing upon the literature on power sharing 
and institutional change. They will almost certainly be able to engage 
rather different audiences. Coltart’s account will have more popular 
appeal, while Bratton’s will draw more academic attention. Furthermore, 
whilst Coltart – sustained by his Christian faith – remains (perversely?) 
optimistic about the future of Zimbabwe, Bratton’s realist approach is 
considerably gloomier. Even so, despite their differences, these contri-
butions complement each other nicely. Both are consumed by key ques-
tions: How can Zimbabwe grapple with its history and resolve its appar-
ently intractable conflicts? What prospect is there for some sort of tran-
sitional justice? Is there any realistic chance of transitioning to democ-
racy? There is no originality in these questions. They are of concern to all 
those who have an abiding interest in Zimbabwe. However, both books 
add considerably to the richness of debate. After a brief review of their 
content, I will discuss how they address these issues. 
Bratton: The Dynamics of Power Politics 
Bratton “analyzes the resilience of authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe through 
the lenses of power politics and elite political settlements” (10). By cap-
turing the state, leaders have been able to entrench lasting arrangements to 
exercise power, never hesitating to use violence and defy the rule of law. 
“Power politics” he borrows from the realist tradition of international 
relations, “which views states as locked in blunt competition to achieve 
self-defined national interests in the absence of overarching external au-
thority” (7), choosing to apply it to the domestic rather than the inter-
national arena. While Thomas Hobbes might well protest that Mugabe’s 
particular conceit is that he embodies the sovereign, Bratton eschews any 
such emphasis upon a “big man,” providing an alternative emphasis on the 
broader civilian–military elite coalition which surrounds the president 
(235). So even when, at critical junctures, such sovereign elites feel com-
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pelled by circumstance to enter into more inclusive pacts with rivals, they 
do their best to undermine these pacts and to return to the status quo ante. 
Beyond his explanation of power politics, Bratton organises the 
book into four parts. First, distinguishing between “power capture,” 
“power sharing,” and “power division,” he provides overviews of the 
different political settlements which have defined Zimbabwean politics. 
The colonial political settlement, which favoured a small white minority, 
went through different iterations: rule by the British South Africa Com-
pany; settler rule under authority delegated from Westminster; settler 
rebellion; and, finally, the Lancaster House independence settlement, 
whereby Britain brokered a compromise between the settler regime and 
African liberation movements, granting majority rule in return for guar-
antees of property and economic continuity. However, under this settle-
ment (1980), ZANU-PF’s drive for exclusive power saw it waging ethno-
cidal war against its internal rival, Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU), and violently cajoling the latter into collapsing 
itself into the ruling party in 1987. Subsequently, in the wake of escalat-
ing economic and political crises, ZANU-PF was to be bundled into a 
power-sharing arrangement with a new rival, the Movement for Demo-
cratic Change (MDC), in 2008. Bratton characterises these settlements as 
“elite pacts” rather than “social contracts,” with elite interests continu-
ously predominating. All of them have been built upon “manipulation of 
the law, economic exclusion, political intimidation, covert operations, 
and […] physical violence” (7). 
In Part 2, Bratton goes beyond other accounts of the post-2008 pe-
riod by placing the MDC–ZANU-PF coalition in a cross-national, African 
context. Power sharing between rival elites was implemented relatively 
successfully to end settler rule in South Africa and civil war in Sierra 
Leone. However, it was far less successful in Kenya. Although it brought a 
momentary halt to violence following the disputed presidential elections of 
2007, it enabled a president (Kibaki) to retain power despite having pos-
sibly lost the election. Indeed, the coalition period failed to address the 
deep structural domination long enjoyed by the Kikuyu elite (118). Bratton 
concludes that whereas in South Africa and Sierra Leone political adver-
saries saw advantages in resolving differences by talking rather than 
fighting, in Kenya, and as he goes on to detail, in Zimbabwe, power shar-
ing was used by incumbent elites to regroup and recapture the state. 
In Part 3, Bratton turns to fundamental reforms that he considers 
necessary for countries to resolve intractable domestic conflicts. In the 
Zimbabwean case, he refers to constitution making, election manage-
ment, security sector reform, and transitional justice. The first three of 
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these have already received considerable attention, there being wide 
consensus that for Zimbabwe to make progress towards democracy, it 
needs a fully inclusive constitutional settlement, it needs elections to be 
independently managed, and it needs civilian control to be asserted over 
the military. How to achieve these worthy ends is a more difficult matter, 
and Bratton’s commentaries (for instance, that the best hope for profes-
sionalisation of the military lies simply in the passing of the generation 
which fought the liberation war) are as sensible as any. Most valuable, 
however, is his discussion of the need and prospects for transitional 
justice, to which I turn in more detail below.  
His concluding Part 4 attempts to reflect upon the implications of 
the Zimbabwean case for theory about power sharing and institutional 
change for policymakers, and not least, the Zimbabwean people. He had 
the advantage of writing after the 2013 election, when although ZANU-
PF undoubtedly engaged in its customary chicanery, it nonetheless won a 
renewed mandate, despite popular awareness of its past oppressions. In 
the 2013 election, Bratton suggests, many people voted for ZANU-PF 
simply because they feared that its rejection would result in a renewal of 
political violence and conflict (244). In turn, he holds out little hope that 
leadership succession within the ruling party will lead to a more liberal 
social compact. Until that time, “the people of Zimbabwe will likely opt 
for social peace and stability, rather than transitional justice or even 
democratic liberty” (245). 
Coltart: The Struggle against Tyranny 
Coltart’s volume is prefaced by an impressive number of endorsements by 
the great and the good. The one I like the most was penned by David 
Blair, chief foreign correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, who describes 
Coltart’s book as “an extended love letter to Zimbabwe,” citing the au-
thor’s introductory comments, where he writes of Zimbabwe’s “moun-
tains, rivers, savannah plains, teak forests, rich soils, abundant water,” and 
so on, along with “some of the most literate, hardworking, and kindest 
people on the planet.” Although he acknowledges that Zimbabwe’s history 
has been tumultuous, he is nonetheless “more than ever enthralled by this 
great nation.” What Zimbabwe needs, he argues, is democracy – “a new 
birth of freedom in which government of the people, by the people, and 
for the people is cherished” (xiv). This is obviously endearing stuff. Yet it 
also embodies an acute contradiction: How did “the kindest people on the 
planet” give rise to such a brutally authoritarian post-independence re-
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gime? It is this contradiction that Coltart seeks to unravel, albeit in a man-
ner more personal and less analytical than Bratton. 
Coltart’s outline of Zimbabwe’s historical trajectory, tracing the 
country’s movement from racial to liberation-movement authoritarian-
ism is not original in itself. It has been traced many times before. How-
ever, what is original is the extensive detail and insider knowledge of 
many events and processes. For a start, Coltart’s account is utterly com-
pelling, even for those already soaked in Zimbabwean history. In partic-
ular, he has rendered a major service by providing details of disappear-
ances, arrests, incarcerations, cases of torture, persecutions, prosecutions 
– and, too often, murders – of numerous victims of the regime. Such 
evils are of course valuably aggregated by civil society organisations such 
as Amnesty International, but Coltart refers to the individuals involved, 
for many of whom he served as a lawyer. For the families of such victims 
as much as the victims themselves, it is important to have their names 
inscribed into history. Further, in telling these individual stories, Coltart 
weaves a fascinating account of how a relatively small number of indi-
viduals – lawyers, activists, pastors, liberal whites and Africans alike, and 
so on – worked to expose and counter regime oppression. Lawyers will 
be gratified that even in situations where the law, judges, and the courts 
had been largely suborned by the state, legal processes could sometimes 
result in unexpectedly favourable outcomes. They will be less impressed, 
however, by the need for even distinguished lawyers like Coltart and 
other opponents of the regime who defend individuals in the courts to 
take extreme measures to preserve their personal safety, ranging from 
the wearing of bulletproof jackets to the necessity of packed suitcases in 
case of arrest, along with the importance of “safe houses” for the pro-
tection of their families. This account joins others (e.g. Todd 2007) in 
reminding us very forcibly of the immense courage it has taken to op-
pose vicious repression in Zimbabwe. In Coltart’s case, he could easily 
have emigrated – but rather than take the easy route out, he deliberately 
gave up his British citizenship, thereby making it more difficult for the 
regime to expel him.  
Any attempt to summarise Coltart’s account would be foolhardy, so 
I will simply focus upon three aspects of it which I feel are of particular 
value. The first is that it contributes to the growing literature (such as 
Godwin 1996) on “white Rhodesia.” Coltart is searingly honest in his 
account of how, as a politically callow youth, he opted to do his national 
service rather than flee. Ian Smith’s government had decreed that, upon 
turning 18, all boys should do their service immediately after school 
(previously they had been allowed to attend university first). Despite the 
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strong reservations of his parents, who opposed Smith and wanted their 
son to avoid the draft, Coltart took the view of the white majority that it 
was cowardly not to defend the country in the face of a “communist” 
threat. For Coltart, therefore, “national service was a necessary evil to 
secure a smooth, gradual transition to majority rule rather than a revolu-
tion” (53).  
Coltart signed up for the police for three years, and he describes his 
involvement in anti-guerrilla activities in detail. Yet it was while he was 
with the police that he began to change. As a totally inexperienced of-
ficer, he found himself heavily dependent upon black subordinates, who 
were more competent than he was. Over time, too, he was to become 
increasingly disillusioned by the methods used to combat “terrorists,” 
(although he equally deplored the brutalities of the other side). Ulti-
mately, this led to his leaving the police early and heading for undergrad-
uate studies in law at the University of Cape Town (UCT). There he 
mixed initially with other conservative “Rhodies” before a Damascene 
conversion to active (as opposed to nominal) Christianity and commu-
nity work in the Crossroads squatter camp, along with exposure to UCT 
liberalism, brought about a transformation in his views. Following the 
1980 election, Coltart committed to returning to a new, more inclusive 
Zimbabwe. It was there, as a fully fledged lawyer, that he was to become 
drawn into the networks of activists, including that of former prime 
minister Garfield Todd and his daughter Judith, which emerged in de-
fence of human rights as the Mugabe regime cranked up its assaults 
upon its opponents. 
Fast-forward to the early 2000s, and there is valuable material on 
the early development of the MDC, which Coltart joined only after he 
had been invited to become its secretary for legal affairs. Soon he was 
heavily involved in both the MDC’s call for a “no” vote in the 2000 
referendum on ZANU-PF’s proposed new constitution and the MDC’s 
subsequent campaign in the 2000 elections, the latter conducted amidst a 
reign of terror by ZANU-PF. Standing as the MDC candidate in his 
home town of Bulawayo, Coltart was elected to parliament by a sweep-
ing majority. Overall, however, with many of its supporters (notably in 
rural areas) subjected to extreme violence, the MDC was denied victory. 
So it was that Coltart became caught up in the maelstrom of opposition 
politics, much of it concerning how parliamentary, media, and legal cam-
paigning should relate to mass action. This was to involve him in all sorts 
of legal tangles with ZANU-PF. It also brought him and the MDC up 
against unwelcome regional realities, such as South Africa’s and the 
SADC’s backing of the result of the 2005 election, in which once again 
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ZANU-PF had trashed virtually all of the SADC’s own electoral guide-
lines. “History had come full circle. Just as the Nationalists had allowed 
the RF to frustrate the democratic will of the people, the ANC was do-
ing the same for ZANU-PF” (419).  
Of particular interest is Coltart’s account of how the MDC began to 
unravel into rival factions in the wake of that election. Increasingly, there 
were youth members of the MDC who wanted to return fire with fire, 
and were impatient that the party’s involvement in parliamentary pro-
cesses had changed nothing. While Coltart insisted that it was the MDC’s 
commitment to non-violence which had consistently distinguished it 
from ZANU-PF, party leader Morgan Tsvangirai was more equivocal. 
Subsequently, latent tensions became overt when the party split around 
whether to participate in the 2005 Senate elections (the Senate having 
been arbitrarily reinvented after prior abolition in 1989). Despite vigor-
ous efforts by Coltart to broker a peace, the breach was confirmed in 
January 2006, when the MDC broke into two factions, one (the majority) 
led by Tsvangirai (MDC-T), the other by Gibson Sibanda, who was soon 
replaced by Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M). Initially undecided on which 
faction to join, Coltart’s mind was made up by revelations made to him 
that MDC operatives were being trained in South Africa. Although it was 
not clear whether the training was defensive or offensive, weapons were 
clearly involved. Apart from his own personal commitment to non-vio-
lence, he regarded this as likely to invite an even harder crackdown by 
ZANU-PF on its opponents (440–441).  
The division of the MDC was to chronically weaken the opposition 
starting in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Although together the two 
MDCs won a majority (MDC-T [99] + MDC-M [10] v. ZANU-PF [97]), 
the divide caused them to lose the Senate and denied them a larger ma-
jority in the Assembly. Nor did it help them in the presidential election 
when the MDC-M opted to back ZANU-PF rebel Simba Makoni (8.3 
per cent) rather than Tsvangirai (47.9 per cent), this – if the official re-
sults are to be believed (which actually they are not!) – depriving the 
latter of an absolute majority over Mugabe, forcing him under the elec-
toral rules into a run-off election. Coltart confirms that security person-
nel thereupon resorted to extreme levels of violence to keep Mugabe in 
power, which ultimately forced Tsvangirai to pull out of the campaign to 
protect the safety of his supporters (476–477). 
There is much detail provided about the formation of the power-
sharing coalition, although little that is new. However, what is fascinating 
is Coltart’s description of his time in office as the MDC-M’s nominee to 
head the Ministry of Education. His account of how he managed to 
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restore the schools system to something resembling functionality has its 
own interest, but for most, the real value will lie in his description of the 
workings of the coalition. How ZANU-PF ministers were clearly in awe 
of Mugabe; how senior civil servants undermined MDC ministers; how 
too many MDC ministers became seduced by the spoils of office; and 
how Coltart perceived distinctions between hardline ZANU-PF minis-
ters, who were cynically exploiting the Government of National Unity 
(GNU), and “moderates” (led by Vice President Joice Mujuru), with 
whom he could work. Ultimately, of course, this was to no avail, for as 
the 2013 election was looming, it became clear that ZANU-PF was in-
tent on manipulating the electoral process – something it achieved with 
resounding success. 
Two further points: First, Coltart’s account gives copious detail of 
his continuous travels overseas, his easy access to high foreign quarters, 
and the numerous linkages that existed between civil society organisa-
tions and with foreign funders. Although this exposed ZANU-PF’s op-
ponents to accusations of imperialism, it speaks to the importance of 
external support for civil society where political space is being closed 
down. Second, a cruel criticism which may be made of Coltart is that he 
paints himself as Tarzan in Africa. Let us concede that he is not immod-
est! However, the more important point is that we need far more, not 
fewer, memoirs by holders of high offices in Africa. Penning autobiog-
raphies is the staple activity of retired politicians in the West. In Africa, 
too few retire, and even fewer write, leaving gaping holes in African 
history (see Tsvangirai 2011 for a relevant exception). 
Zimbabwean History: Have Opportunities
Been Missed? 
There is a case for counter-factual history if it points to how, at critical 
junctures, choices were made which altered a country’s long term histori-
cal trajectory. In the case of Zimbabwe, these two books pose the ques-
tion of whether things might have been different had the liberal open-
ings under Garfield Todd in the 1950s not occurred and had the coali-
tion government after 2008 not been displaced. 
Coltart admits to Garfield Todd, prime minister from 1953 to 1958, 
being one of his heroes. His vision had been one of “a moderate, toler-
ant, and democratic Zimbabwe” (359). As prime minister he had intro-
duced major reforms aimed at improving the education of the black 
majority and made progress towards extending political rights to blacks. 
However, such moves lost him the confidence of his cabinet, and he was 
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forced out of office. Todd was “hardly a liberal in the Western sense,” 
yet nonetheless, “he was also a visionary and a man way ahead of his 
time” (13).  
There can be no quarrel with the view that Todd – who was to play 
an honourable role in protesting human rights abuses under both Smith 
and Mugabe – deserves all the plaudits he gets. But did his ousting in 
1958 really change the course of history? To be fair, Coltart does not 
explicitly say so, but his yearning that history might have worked out 
differently if Todd’s rule had been allowed to run its course is very evi-
dent: “greater liberty and economic development might have been 
achieved had war been avoided” (597). Along those lines, he sees strong 
continuities between settler and liberation-movement rule: “Rhodes 
begat Smith and Smith begat Mugabe” (599). Ultimately, therefore, Col-
tart’s regrets about missed opportunities give way to realism, and an 
appreciation of the racially polarising dynamics of settler rule (14–19).1 
Bratton gives short shrift to any idea of a lost liberal moment in 
settler politics. Indeed, he quotes Colin Leys’ 1959 assessment that the 
dependence of the settler community upon its control of the state for its 
presence in the country “precluded the possibility that the power would 
be voluntarily shared with the rest of the population” (41). Colonial 
domination, Bratton insists, started and ended with political violence, the 
short-lived “internal settlement,” headed by Abel Muzorewa (1978–
1980), constituting nothing more than a last ditch attempt by settlers to 
rule through conservative black agents (34). Subsequently, although the 
Lancaster House settlement was politically inclusive, it was externally 
driven, lacked local buy-in, and failed to overcome the racial divide. 
Furthermore, ZANU-PF was to establish its hegemony and hence read-
ily appropriate the authoritarian legacy of the colonial state. 
Coltart has no doubts that the decision by the two MDCs to enter 
the coalition government with ZANU-PF following the 2008 elections 
was the right thing to do. Given a collapsed economy, hyperinflation and 
the alarming breakout of a cholera epidemic, Zimbabwe was “in more 
danger than ever of becoming a failed state” (485). Although heavy po-
litical wrangling left ZANU-PF in control of all the coercive ministries 
1  The argument that white Rhodesia’s “last chance” was lost in 1958 is pursued 
at length by Holderness (1985), one of Todd’s MPs. His account offers a valu-
able reminder that some Rhodesian whites were genuinely liberally inclined. 
However, it is ultimately unconvincing, if only because Todd would never have 
become prime minister to kick-start the liberal moment had not his predeces-
sor, Roy Welensky, moved “upstairs” to become prime minister of the new 
Central African Federation. 
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(Defence, Security, and Justice), Bratton contends that no option re-
mained but to execute the Global Political Agreement (GPA) that had 
been agreed upon in September 2008, despite Mugabe having unilaterally 
breached many of its key provisions. Coltart was wary of working with 
ZANU-PF ministers when they had been responsible for so much suf-
fering, but there were no other “peaceful, non-violent” alternatives at 
hand. The constructive work which he was subsequently enabled to do at 
the Ministry of Education leaves him convinced that participation in the 
GNU was “the right thing to do” (485). Yet when he subsequently lost 
his seat at the next election, his dominant emotion was relief (577). Intra-
MDC squabbling and brazen trampling over the coalition agreement by 
ZANU-PF had allowed disillusion to set in. When, subsequently (after 
the 2013 election), Mugabe dismissed Joice Mujuru, “any hope that the 
moderates would prevail within ZANU-PF was dashed” (585), and Zim-
babwe’s prospects looked as grim as ever. 
Bratton concurs that the MDCs had little option unless they were 
prepared to return to the wilderness of opposition politics. Offering a 
careful analysis of the intense pressures placed upon both the MDCs and 
ZANU-PF by the SADC and the AU, he points out the very different 
incentives on offer. To the MDCs, second prize though it was, the coali-
tion offered a foot in the door to state power and the possibility of fur-
ther political reform. For ZANU-PF, it promised an easing of diplomatic 
isolation and an inflow of resources to arrest the country’s economic free 
fall. Above all, however, “the GNU bought time to circle the wagons, 
restock the treasury (and the armory), and prepare to recapture state 
power” (138). He also notes the critical fact that the settlement was a 
political deal which failed to assert civilian control over the military. Con-
sequently, ZANU-PF entered the coalition period with a reserved do-
main of power: the security complex, impenetrable to reformers, which 
was “dead set against any transition to democracy or the rule of law” 
(139). They would prove “military spoilers” who, enjoying direct access 
to plentiful diamond revenues, exerted a veto over political reform. Con-
sequently, whereas the colonial political settlement had been “durable 
but illegitimate,” the GNU was, in the mind of its most powerful partici-
pants, only an interim arrangement (141). 
It may be argued that Bratton is a beneficiary of hindsight while 
Coltart and his MDC colleagues had to grapple with what actions to take 
when confronted by hugely circumscribed options. In essence, as argued 
elsewhere (for example, Southall 2013), the MDC was between a rock 
and a hard place, and would probably have drawn extensive retrospective 
criticism if it had not entered the coalition. Nonetheless, for all that Col-
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tart remains convinced that the MDCs were correct to join the coalition, 
he also provides ample evidence that they failed to maximise even their 
limited opportunities. Rivalry between leading personalities allowed 
ZANU-PF to stoke division between the two MDCs, blunting their effec-
tiveness. This led ultimately to their competing against each other in the 
2013 election (always particularly damaging to minority parties under first-
past-the-post electoral systems). Coltart suggests that had the two MDCs 
been able to come to some agreement, then the logical option – given 
ZANU-PF’s blatant manipulation of the electoral regulations – would 
have been to withdraw from the election, thereby compelling the SADC to 
hold ZANU-PF to account. As it was, their failure to agree meant that 
neither could withdraw from the election for fear of giving the other 
credibility (571). In short, if this was a lost opportunity, the MDCs were 
significantly to blame. 
Tackling Tyranny: Dealing with the Past
for a Better Future 
There is surprisingly little literature on transitional justice in Zimbabwe, 
despite the fact that, under the terms of the GPA, the GNU established 
the Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation, and Integration (see 
Benyera 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Benyera 2015; Ngwenya and Harris 
2015). Perhaps this is because, however great the need for a serious 
national conversation about such issues, there is simultaneously a recog-
nition that the time is not ripe for any such debate to lead to meaningful 
measures. In essence, there is popular as well as academic recognition 
that power politics has always prevailed in Zimbabwe and continues to 
do so. Bratton labels this “A History of Impunity,” with both colonial 
and postcolonial regimes granting sweeping amnesties to human rights 
abusers (218). Yet this does not mean that the need to have such a con-
versation goes away; for this reason, the contributions of both Coltart 
and Bratton are to be warmly welcomed. 
Coltart identifies the cult of war pursued by both colonial and post-
colonial regimes as having poisoned Zimbabwe’s entire society. In Zim-
babwe, he argues, many political protagonists are continuing to fight the 
liberation war, as if independence never happened. The wounds of that 
struggle have continued to fester, and while this does not justify the 
gross abuses of human rights which have taken place since 1980, it may 
help to explain them. “Until we have some process to enable us all to 
come to terms with our past, our past will continue to haunt us” (596). 
While there will be those who contest his view that the war of the 1970s 
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was avoidable, there will be much wider agreement that the tragedy of 
contemporary Zimbabwe violence “has become an acceptable means of 
resolving domestic political problems” (597). Unfortunately, however, 
having highlighted the problem, save for asserting the need for the na-
tion to come to terms with its past if democracy and development are to 
be achieved, he offers little indication of how it might be tackled. 
By contrast, Bratton provides us with chapter and verse of how 
sweeping amnesties have been provided to those who have committed 
atrocities by both the colonial and postcolonial regimes. This approach 
was confirmed by the Lancaster House settlement, which pardoned com-
batants from both sides of the independence war, effectively pre-empting 
prosecutions or any official process to document the truth. Although 
justified as a means to achieve national reconciliation, this allowed for no 
moral reckoning, and denied justice to victims and survivors of human 
rights abuses. With many perpetrators of violence in the war taking up 
positions in the new government, including the security forces, the cycle 
of impunity was reinforced. Most notoriously, a Commission of Inquiry 
into the Matabeleland Disturbances (the “Gukurahundi”) – which was 
established under international pressure – issued a report that was never 
published, and the government never made any acknowledgement of its 
culpability, not to mention offering any redress. This is the way it has 
been, with political violence becoming systematically deployed as an in-
strument of government, notably during elections, while perpetrators 
have no fear of prosecution but every expectation of impunity. 
Is there any way out of this cycle? Bratton provides us with an ex-
emplary overview of the dilemmas of transitional justice (the trade-offs 
between morality and politics) and the mechanisms which have been used 
internationally and in Africa to achieve it (prosecutions, truth commis-
sions, amnesty, and mixed models). However, he comes to the conclu-
sion – citing how the institutions established under the GNU to promote 
national reconciliation and human rights were stymied by lack of re-
sources and clear mandates – that there is little immediate prospect of 
securing prosecutions or establishing a functional truth commission. 
Although he hails the important work done by Zimbabwean NGOs in 
providing relief to victims and gathering evidence against perpetrators of 
violence for further use, he asserts that “the political reality of militarized 
authoritarianism in Zimbabwe means some measure of transitional jus-
tice may have to be denied or at least deferred” (227). Interestingly, he 
cites survey data demonstrating that while consistent majorities of re-
spondents wanted violators to be punished, and supporters of the coun-
try’s democratic movement vigorously oppose any suggestion of a fur-
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ther blanket amnesty, generally Zimbabweans are realists. While the old 
guard of power politicians remains in place, they opt for peace over 
justice (226–227). Transitional justice must therefore await democracy. 
But, realistically, what are the prospects for democracy? 
Democracy: Damned or Delayed? 
Coltart agrees with Bratton that Zimbabweans, having borne the brunt 
of war and violence, have pragmatically opted for peace rather than con-
frontation. Support for war and violence has “never gained traction 
among the vast majority of Zimbabweans” (notwithstanding, apparently, 
those in the MDC whose desire to return ZANU-PF fire with fire so 
dismayed Coltart during the mid-2000s). For Coltart, therefore, non-
violent struggle would seem to represent not just a moral imperative but 
politically and pragmatically the only viable way to challenge ZANU-PF. 
Furthermore, rather than awaiting another messiah (whether a Tsvangirai 
or a Mujuru), Zimbabweans will need to place policy and principle ahead 
of personality if they wish to see a democratic dawn (600–601).  
We should concede that some hope of utopia is necessary if politi-
cal activism is to be sustained in seemingly impossible situations. But 
what are the realistic prospects of making progress towards democracy? 
Bratton provides some concluding thoughts that are simultaneously trite, 
in that they are so obvious, and profound, in that Zimbabwean demo-
crats will only ignore them at their cost. (We may add that they are easier 
said than done). Reflecting on the “decisive defeat” of the opposition in 
2013, Bratton urges the MDC or successor political parties to realise that 
political cohabitation with an entrenched incumbent will only undermine 
opposition leaderships; there is need for ongoing party organisation, 
especially in rural areas; opposition parties cannot afford factionalism, 
and smaller parties should coalesce; even if external parties initiate a 
power-sharing agreement, they will not push hard for political reform if 
they do not feel the opposition is able to provide political order and 
stability. For their part, civil society organisations need to put down 
further roots into society, especially outside urban areas if they are to 
offer education and hope that counters ZANU-PF hegemony. Finally, he 
says, “the future of the country lies in the hands of the long-suffering 
people of Zimbabwe” (244).  
If the bad news is that the 2013 election indicated the Zimbabwean 
people felt the opposition parties had failed them, the good news is that 
they have given ample indication in the past – above all, at the time of 
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the 2008 election – that they are prepared to mobilise behind popular 
movements for change when they believe the moment is opportune.  
Coltart’s valedictory call (601) is that the struggle for democracy con-
tinues. Bratton concurs, but convincingly argues that victory is far from 
certain, and that even if attainable, is likely to be much delayed. 
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